Let N be the set of players and M the set of projects. The multicriteria coalitional model of decision-making over the set of projects is formalized as family of games with different fixed coalitional partitions for each project that required the adoption of a positive or negative decision by each of the players. The players' strategies are decisions about each of the project. The vector-function of payoffs for each player is defined on the set situations in the initial noncooperative game. We reduce the multicriteria noncooperative game to a noncooperative game with scalar payoffs by using the minimax method of multicriteria optimization. Players forms coalitions in order to obtain higher income. Thus, for each project a coalitional game is defined. In each coalitional game it is required to find in some sense optimal solution. Solving successively each of the coalitional games, we get the set of optimal n-tuples for all coalitional games. It is required to find a compromise solution for the choice of a project, i. e. it is required to find a compromise coalitional partition. As an optimality principles are accepted generalized PMS-vector [1] and its modifications, and compromise solution.
Introduction
The set of agents N and the set of projects M are given. Each agent fixed his participation or not participation in the project by one or zero choice. The participation in the project is connected with incomes or losses by different parametres which the agents wants to maximize or minimize. This gives us an optimization problem which can be modeled as multicriteria noncooperative game. We reduce the multicriteria noncooperative game to a noncooperative game with scalar payoffs by using the minimax method of multicriteria optimization. Agents may form coalitions. This problem we will call as multicriteria coalitional model of decision-making.
Denote the players by i ∈ N and the projects by j ∈ M . The family M of different games are considered. In each game G j , j ∈ M the player i has two strategies accept or reject the project. The payoff of the player in each game is determined by the strategies chosen by all players in this game G j . As it was mentioned before the players can form coalitions to increase the payoffs components. In each game G j coalitional partition is formed. The problem is to find the optimal strategies for coalitions and the imputation of the coalitional payoff between the members of the coalition. The games G 1 , . . . , G m are solved by using the PMS-vector and its modifications [1] .
Then having the solutions of games G j , j = 1, m the optimality principle -"the compromise solution" is proposed to select the best projects j * ∈ M .
State of the problem
Consider the following problem. Suppose N = {1 , . . . , n} is the set of players; X i = {0 ; 1} is the set of pure strategies x i of player i , i = 1, n. The strategy x i can take the following values: x i = 0 as a negative decision for the some project and x i = 1 as a positive decision; l i = 2 is the number of pure strategies of player i; x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is the n-tuple of pure strategies chosen by the players; X = i=1 , n X i is the set of n-tuples;
ξ (x i ) = 1 is the mixed strategy of player i; will be used denotation too
i is the probability of making negative decision by the player i for some project, and ξ 1 i is the probability of making positive decision correspondingly; M i is the set of mixed strategies of the i-th player; µ is the n-tuple of mixed strategies chosen by players for some project; M = i=1, n M i is the set of n-tuples in mixed strategies for some project;
r is the vector-function of payoff defined on the set X for each player i , i = 1, n .
Thus, we have multicriteria noncooperative n-person gameG ( x):
Using the minimax method of multicriteria optimization, we reduce the noncooperative n-person gameG(x) to a noncooperative game G(x) with scalar payoffs:
where
Now suppose M = {1 , . . . , m} is the set of projects, which require making positive or negative decision by n players.
A coalitional partitions Σ j of the set N is defined for all j = 1 , m:
Then we have m simultaneous l-person coalitional games G j (x Σ j ) , j = 1 , m , in normal form associated with the game G (x):
Here for all j = 1 , m:
is the l-tuple of strategies of players from coalition S
Cartesian product of the sets of players' strategies, which are included into coalition S j k ;
is the set of l-tuples in the game G j (x Σ j );
is the number of l-tuples in pure strategies in the game
, is the mixed strategy, that is the set of mixed strategies of players from coalition S
is the set of l-tuples in mixed strategies;
is the payoff function of coalition S j k in mixed strategies and defined asẼ
. . .
From the definition of strategyx S j k of coalition S j k it follows that
, . . . ,x S j l and x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) are the same n-tuples in the games G(x) and G j (x Σ j ). However it does not mean that µ = µ Σ j .
Payoff functionH S j k :X → R 1 of coalition S j k for the fixed projects j, j = 1, m, and for the coalitional partition Σ j is defined under condition that:
, is the payoff function of player i in the n-tuple x Σ j . Definition 1. A set of m coalitional l-person games defined by (5) and associated with noncooperative games defined by (1)− (2) is called multicriteria coalitional model of decision-making with constant matrix of payoffs in the noncooperative game.
Definition 2. Solution of the multicriteria coalitional model of decisionmaking with constant matrix of payoffs in the noncooperative game in pure strategies is x * Σ j * , that is Nash equilibrium (NE) in a pure strategies in lperson game G j * (x Σ j * ), with the coalitional partition Σ j * , where coalitional partition Σ j * is the compromise coalitional partition.
Definition 3. Solution of the multicriteria coalitional model of decisionmaking with constant matrix of payoffs in the noncooperative game in mixed strategies is µ * Σ j * , that is Nash equilibrium (NE) in a mixed strategies in lperson game G j * (µ Σ j * ), with the coalitional partition Σ j * , where coalitional partition Σ j * is the compromise coalitional partition. Generalized PMS-vector is used as the coalitional imputation [1] .
Algorithm for solving the problem
Remind the algorithm of constructing the generalized PMS-vector in a coalitional game [1] .
Calculate the values of payoffH
Denote a payoff of coalition S j k in NE in mixed strategies by in NE in mixed strategies µ * 
where s = S j k (s = |S |) is the number of elements of sets S j k (S ), and v (S ) is the maximal guaranteed payoff of S ⊂ S k .
Moreover
Then PMS-vector in the NE in mixed strategies µ *
Also remind that a set of compromise solutions [4] , [5] is
The project j * ∈ C PMS (M ) , on which the minimum is reached is a compromise solution of the game G j (x Σ j ) for all players.
Thus, we have an algorithm for solving the problem. 1. Reduce the multicriteria noncooperative n-person gameG(x) (see (1)) to a noncooperative game G(x) with scalar payoffs (see (2) ) using the minimax method of multicriteria optimization.
2. Fix a j , j = 1 , m.
3. Construct the coalitional G j (x Σ j ) associated with the noncooperative game G(x) for the fixed j.
2. Find the NE µ * Σ j in the coalitional game G j (x Σ j ) and find imputation in NE, that is PMS j (µ * Σ j ). 3. Repeat iterations 1-2 for all other j , j = 1 , m.
Find compromise solution j
* , that is j * ∈ C PMS (M ).
Conclusion
A multicriteria coalitional model of decision-making over the set of projects with constant payoff matrix in the noncooperative game and algorithm for finding optimal solution are constructed in this paper.
